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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & 
Heating, LLC, (hereinafter "Appellants") seek removal of a sign sitting on top 0/ a post, which 
measures about 16 inches in diameter, and two bollards on each side which measure about five 
inches in diameter. Defendant/Highway 101 Investments, LLC (hereinafter "Highway 101") 
erected the sign post and bollards in the northwest corner of a strip of property Highway 101 
owns. The strip of property is 25 feet wide and 378 feet long, and Appellants have a right of 
way over the strip of property. The sign is positioned such that cars, trucks, and vans can drive 
under the sign which advertises Highway 101's storage facility business located on a landlocked 
property at the end of the strip of property over which Appellants have the right-of-way. The 
District Court ruled on summary judgment that Highway 101's use of its servient estate by 
placing the sign post and bollards on the northwest corner of the strip of property does not 
unreasonably interfere with Appellants' right to use the strip of property as a "right of way." 
Accordingly, the District Court granted Highway 101 summary judgment in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Highway 101 agrees in large part with the Statement of Facts Appellants present to the 
Court. However, Highway 101 adds additional facts to bring clarity to the record on appeal. 
1. The arial view that Appellants have attached to their Opening Brief is misleading 
because the view is of the top of the sign which is much larger than the sign post that the actual 
sign sits on top of. For this reason, Highway 101 has attached to this brief in Appendix A 
colored pictures found in the record at R Vol. ", pp. 327, 328, and 329 for ease of the Court to 
get a better perspective of the actual sign post and bollards in relation to the right of way. 
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2. The sign is 20' by 10' sitting on top of an approximately 16 inch diameter post 
about 14 feet above the ground.1 
3. The City of Rexburg permitted Highway 101's use and location of the sign.2 
4. The underlying property for the right-of-way is 25 feet wide, and the sign post 
and bollards are within five to six feet of the northern boundary line leaving at least 19 feet of 
space for use of the right of way.3 
5. Appellants' property that abuts the easement gives Appellants another 40 feet of 
h . 4 space to access t err property. 
6. There is about 59 feet between the sign post and bollards and Appellants' 
building.5 
7. The 19 feet ofthe easement for Appellants to use for ingress and egress is wide 
enough for two trucks to easily pass by each other.6 
8. Highway 101 has had a plat prepared to identify the location of the sign on the 
right of way easement? Highway 101 has attached to this brief in Appendix B the plat found in 
the record at R Vol. II, p. 294 for ease of the Court to get a better perspective of the dimensions 
of the sign post and bollards in relation to the right of way. 
1 R Vol. II, p. 257. 
2 R Vol. II, p. 257. 
3 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
4 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
5 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
6 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
7 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
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9. Even with the sign post and bollards, there is sufficient room for Appellants' 
service trucks, vehicles, UPS vehicles, and Federal Express vehicles to access Appellants' 
property.8 
10. Appellants have admitted that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably 
interfere with their access to their property; nor do they unreasonably interfere with the access 
of Appellants' customers, suppliers, or delivery companies.9 
11. Appellants have admitted that they have sustained no damages by virtue of the 
placement of the sign post and boliards. lO 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Highway 101 accepts Appellants' Course of Proceedings as substantially accurate and 
complete. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is Highway 101 entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellants recite the applicable standard of review on appeal from summary judgment. 
8 R Vol. II, p. 261. 
9 R Vol. II, p. 261. 
10 R Vol. ", p. 261. 
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II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT HIGHWAY 101 MAY 
USE ITS SERVIENT ESTATE IN ANY WAY AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT 
UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WITH APPELLANTS' RIGHT OF WAY PRIVILEGE. 
"'[A]n easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner.'" Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 
534,540 (1999) (quoting Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548 (1991)) 
(emphasis in original). liThe law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of 
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled to 
use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere with, 
the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate." Nampa & Meridian /rr. Dist. v. 
Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 522 (2001). "'The possessor of land subject to an 
easement created by conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating conveyance.'" Carson v. Elliott, 111 
Idaho 889, 779 (Ct.Ap.1986) quoting from the Restatement of Property §486 (1944). 
Stated differently, "[t]he owner of the servient estate is entitled to make uses of the 
property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment of 
the easement." Nampa & Meridian /rr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., supra, 135 Idaho at 
522 (emphasis added); See also Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 890 ("[T]he landowner is 
entitled to make other uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment 
of the easement.") (citing R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY § 8.9 (1984)). The Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.9 (2000) is in line 
with these authorities. It states that "[ e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude ... the 
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holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not 
unreasonably interfere with enjoyment ofthe servitude." As long as the easement holder is 
able to use the easement for access to his land for the specific purpose for which the easement 
was granted, without unreasonable interference, he has received everything to which he is 
legally entitled. Drew v. Sorensen, supra, 133 Idaho at 540. 
This law is consistent with common sense and property rights. An easement holder 
does not own the property underlying the easement (Le., the servient estate)-he simply has a 
right to use the property he does not own for a limited and specific purpose. By giving the 
easement holder a right to use the property for a limited and specific purpose, the owner of the 
servient estate does not give up his right to use his property for any purpose as long as the 
owner's use does not unreasonably interfere with the limited and specific purpose of the 
easement. Otherwise, the easement holder (who has a limited right to use the property) could 
prevent the property owner from using his property thereby gaining an equal right to the 
servient estate in which the easement holder has no ownership interest but an interest only for 
a limited and specific purpose. 
The first Idaho case ever to apply the "reasonableness test" is Boydstun Beach 
Association v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986). In Boydstun Beach, a deed 
created a beach easement (access was granted along a twenty-five foot strip) together with 
boating and bathing privileges, and parking privileges along a 200 foot length of lakefront 
property 75 feet wide. The Aliens bought a lakefront lot burdened by the easement and nearly 
all of their yard including grass, landscaping and sprinkler system were on the lakefront 
easement. The Association sought an injunction prohibiting any further interference with the 
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easement and an order directing the Aliens to remove the obstructions (trees, rocks, bushes, 
railroad ties, and lawn sprinklers). 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with 5 Restatement of Property, Servitudes §486 
(1944). That section provides: 
The possessor land subject to an easement created by conveyance is 
privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of the creating conveyance. 
Comment: 
a. Uses not inconsistent with conveyance. So far as the language of the 
conveyance creating an easement precisely defines the privileges of the owner 
of it, the privileges of use of the owner of the servient tenement are also 
precisely defined. As the precision of definition decreases, the application of the 
principle that the owner of the easement and the possessor of the servient 
tenement must be reasonable in the exercise of their respective privileges 
becomes more pronounced. Under this principle, the privilege of use of the 
possessor of the servient tenement may vary as the respective needs of himself 
and the owner of the easement vary. 
Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 376 (emphasis added). 
The court noted that "[u]nder §486 it is necessary to determine the precision of the 
granting language. To the degree privileges are expressly granted the easement owner's rights 
are paramount to those of the servient owner. These respective rights are correlative and 
where the grant is general in nature the owner of the servient estate is entitled to use the 
estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere with, the use 
of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. Thus, we begin by isolating the 
privileges specifically granted by the easement." Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 
111 Idaho at 376-377 (emphasis added). "An easement owner is entitled to relief upon a 
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showing that he is obstructed from exercising privileges granted by an easement." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Within this framework, the court looked first to the written conveyance and found that 
"the easement prohibits structures on the beach or parking space, but otherwise does not limit 
the allowed privileges in location or time of use." Therefore, the court precluded a fence 
erected through the 75 foot easement that obstructed parking but allowed the fence and even 
a gate on the easement where they did not obstruct parking and were not on the beach 
because these were "sensible," i.e., reasonable. Similarly, the court found that the trial court's 
open fire prohibition was reasonable because there was no express language in the deed on 
this privilege: 
The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the 
uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent 
with the normal development of their respective lands .... Mandating the use 
of roasting devices is a reasonable balance between the easement owner's 
interest in picnicking and the protection and enjoyment of the servient estate. 
Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 378. 
But where the easement granted a privilege in express and specific rather than 
general terms, the trial court could not apply the "reasonableness test" because to do 
so would bypass the legal rights of the easement owners and go directly to the 
equitable resolution of the parties' conflicting interests. Therefore, the trial court could 
not prohibit parking on the Aliens' lawn even though it created a nuisance because the 
easement expressly created a privilege to park on the entire 200 by 75 foot strip. 
Similarly, the trial court could not restrict use of the easement between the hours of 
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12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. because the easement expressly granted a privilege for 
ingress and egress without such limitations. 
Finally, the court reversed and remanded the case with respect to the retaining wall for 
"[f]urther findings ... to determine if the wall obstructs the parking, boating or bathing 
privileges granted by the easement" with specific instructions that the trial court was to 
"indicate whether these findings are based on the specific language of the easement [in which 
case the "reasonableness test" would not apply] or on the principles applicable to easement 
granted in general terms" in which case the "reasonableness test" would apply. Boydstun 
Beach Association v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 379 (emphasis added). 
The rules announced in Boydstun Beach Association are simple and straightforward. 
The court looks first to the written instrument itself to identify the privilege granted in the 
deed. If the deed grants the privilege in express and specific terms, the court cannot apply 
"equitable principles" or what is reasonable under the circumstances. But if the deed grants a 
privilege in general terms, the court allows the proposed use of the servient estate as long as 
the proposed use is reasonable in view of the privilege granted in the deed. Finally, none of 
these rules involves a "bright line test" like the one Appellants urge this Court to apply. 
The next Idaho case to apply the "reasonableness test" was Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 
Idaho at 889 (Ct.App.1986). Carson involved an obstruction placed in a right of way easement. 
The court upheld the trial court's removal of a raised garden placed in the "eye" of the circular 
end of the single driveway providing access to two homes. In so doing, the court noted the 
following: 
Because an easement authorizes limited use ofthe strip of property, the 
landowner is entitled to make other uses of the property that do not 
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unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the easement .... Whether a 
particular use by the landowner is an unreasonable interference with enjoyment 
of the easement is a question of fact. 
Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 890 (emphasis added). 
The record contained substantial evidence that "the operation of vehicles had been 
hindered by the garden. Carson's cars and a boat occasionally required the extra room in the 
circle's center to turn around. These vehicles sometimes struck the raised garden." Carson v. 
Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho at 891. 
The court in Carson never identified whether the privilege the deed granted was 
express and specific or general. Instead, the court simply said that "Carson enjoys an 
easement to use the driveway./I However, the reason the court found against allowing 
the continuation of the raised garden was that it unreasonably interfered with the 
plaintiff's use of her easement to use the driveway. The important point is that the 
court applied a "reasonableness test," not a "bright line test" on whether the raised 
garden would stay or go. 
This Court has also applied the "reasonableness test" in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation 
District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at 518 to an express 40 foot 
easement. At issue in Nampa was whether Washington Federal Savings could erect a fence and 
sidewalk within an irrigation district's lateral maintenance easement. The irrigation district 
claimed that Washington Federal Savings could not install the fence and sidewalk within the 
easement. 
This Court began its analysis by citing to Carson and Boydstun Beach as well-settled 
Idaho law on the issue: 
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The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of dominant 
and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled 
to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not 
materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the 
dominant estate. In other words, the servient estate owner is entitled to make 
uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant 
estate owner's enjoyment of the easement. Thus, an easement owner is entitled 
to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from exercising privileges granted 
in the easement." 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. V. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho 
at 522-523 (emphasis added). 
The court then applied the law to the trial court's findings and conclusions agreeing 
with the trial court as follows: 
Because NMID failed to show that the sidewalk and proposed fence 
would unreasonably interfere with its easement, the district court denied 
NMID's injunction, holding that Washington Federal was entitled to construct 
the sidewalk and fence. 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho 
at 521 (emphasis added). 
In short, this Court found that "NMID's activity will be so infrequent that its easement 
rights will not be unreasonably interfered with" and affirmed the trial court's order allowing 
for the installation of the fence and sidewalk. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. V. 
Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at 522 (emphasis added). 
Appellants cite to several cases from other jurisdictions to support their position against 
a reasonableness test. Appellants argue that this Court should overrule the district court and 
adopt a bright line/per se test to easements irrespective of whether they are specific. The 
District Court appropriately declined Appellants' similar invitation: "After reading the parties' 
briefs and conducting additional research, this Court finds it unnecessary to consult the laws of 
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foreign jurisdictions .... On numerous occasions subsequent to Boydstun Beach, the appellate 
courts of Idaho have addressed the rights and privileges of servient estate owners. This court, 
however, is not aware of any Idaho case that has applied something other than the 
reasonableness test."ll 
Instead, the District Court applied Idaho law and looked to the deed itself to determine 
whether the privilege granted in the conveying deed is express and specific or general in nature 
and properly concluded the following: 
Plaintiffs' are entitled to full enjoyment of the privilege granted them by their 
Easement, and Plaintiffs are entitled to relief upon showing they are obstructed from 
exercising that privilege. 
The privilege created by the Easement is {a right-of-way,' or the right to use the 
Strip of property for ingress and egress. The legal description contained in the granting 
language precisely describes the location of the land upon which Plaintiffs can exercise 
that privilege. Thus, while the location ofthe Easement is precisely defined, the 
privilege is stated generally as a {right-of-way.' This Court concludes Highwway 101 has 
the right to use its servient estate (the Strip of property) in a manner that does not 
unreasonably interfere with the Plaintffs' right to use the Strip of property as a {right-of-
way.,12 
Accordingly, the District Court next considered whether Highway 101's use of its property 
unreasonably interfered with Appellants' right of way privilege. 
III. 
APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC 25 FOOT WIDE EASEMENT 
Underpinning Appellants' entire argument is their position that they own an express and 
specific 25 foot wide easement. They argue that since they have an express and specific 25 foot 
wide easement, the District Court could not apply a reasonableness test and "shrink" the 25 
feet to 19 feet. However, Appellants confuse the concept of "express" with "specific": 
11 R Vol. ",, pp. 423-424 (emphasis added). 
12 R Vol. ",, pp. 426-427 (emphasis in original). 
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Although Appellants have an express right of way, Appellants do not have an express and 
specific 25 foot wide right of way. 
The deed by which Appellants acquired their property states: 
ALSO, A right-of-way to be used in common with others described as 
follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 17, township 6 North, 
Range 40 East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 
140.90 feet; thence North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and 
running thence North 89°49' 50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 
feet; thence South 89°49' 50" West 394.40 feet; thence North 3r37' 44 
East 29.74 feet to the point of beginning.13 
Although the deed description does not specifically state "over the property described as 
follows," such language is implied because the description is a metes and bounds legal 
description of the property over which the easement runs and not a description of the 
easement itself. Moreover, it is the same description used in the fee simple transfer of the 
property to Highway 101. 
Since the right of way was granted in writing it is "express." However, since it is merely 
describes a "right of way" and not a "25 foot wide easement," it is a general privilege and not a 
specific one. Significantly, the conveyance does not read a "25 foot wide right of way" nor does 
it contain any prohibitions in it to any other uses. Any other reading would give Appellants a 
fee simple interest in the property rather than a right to traverse the property at issue. 
Since Appellants do not have an express and specific 25 foot wide easement, the District 
Court's decision did not shrink their easement. Appellants assert that "The district court ruled 
that the location of the right is more than is necessary - Johnson and Allen do not need the full 
13 R Vol. II, p. 256. 
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25 feet set out in their deeds.,,14 The Memorandum Decision and Order in this case makes no 
such statement or findings. Appellants make that assertion only to liken this case to Boydstun 
Beach Ass'n v. Allen, supra, 111 Idaho at 370, and to support their argument that the District 
Court here-like the trial court in Boydstun Beach-committed reversible error by impinging 
upon their alleged express and specific 25 foot wide easement. 
Were the deed meant to grant an express and specific 25 foot wide right of way, it 
would simply have said "a 25 foot wide right of way." To get around this point of fact, 
Appellants for the first time assert that "Johnson and Allen, and numerous prior owners of the 
parcels, purchased their property in reliance on the existence of the 25 foot right-of-way 
conveyed by their deeds. illS Appellants raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Moreover, 
there is no evidence in the record to support it. The deed simply grants a general right of way 
to cross over the strip of property that is about 25 feet wide and 378 feet long to access 
abutting properties. Appellants argue that the right of way is not limited to ingress and egress 
or access to their property. However, Highway 101 submits that a right of way granted to an 
adjoining property owner serves no purpose other than to provide ingress and egress or access 
to his property. Additionally, in this case, such general right was granted to be used in common 
with others. No other reasonable interpretation exists other than ingress and egress for a right 
of way privilege if it is to be in common with others. 
If this Court were to take Appellants' argument to its logical conclusion, anyone else's 
use ofthe easement would amount to an obstruction to Appellants. In fact, Appellants 
themselves, by leaving vehicles parked on the easement for extended periods of time, would be 
14 See p.10 of Appellants' Brief dated May 24,2012. 
15 See pp. 10-11 of Appellants' Brief dated May 24,2012. 
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guilty of obstructing the easement because "the others" who share the right of way easement 
would be deprived of using the exact area under the parked vehicle even though they could use 
the easement for a right of way by going around the parked vehicle. The underlying premise of 
Appellants' argument, that Appellants own an express and specific 25 foot wide easement, is 
not grounded in either logic or fact. 
At bottom, the conveyance does not read a "25 foot wide right of way" or expressly 
state that Appellants have the specific right to use the entire width of their easement as a right 
of way or any other restricting language. The deed simply gives Appellants a general privilege 
over the described property for a right of way. Therefore, although Appellants have an express 
easement, it is not an easement of a specific width or length, and therefore a general privilege 
for a right of way over the described property. When dealing with a general privilege, the law 
in Idaho requires the Court to look at whether the proposed use unreasonably interferes with 
the privilege granted in the deed conveying the easement. 
IV. 
THE SIGN POST AND BOLLARDS DO NOT UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WITH 
APPELLANTS' RIGHT OF WAY PRIVILEGE. 
A. Appellants Admit That Highway 101's Sign Post And Bollards Do Not 
Unreasonably Interfere With Their Right Of Way Privilege. 
Appellants were given a right of way easement that allows them to cross over the 
servient estate for access to their property. This means that as long as Appellants are able to 
use the servient estate for access to their land without unreasonable interference, they have 
received everything to which they are legally entitled. In other words, as the owner of the 
servient estate, Highway 101 has the right to use the property underlying the right of way 
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easement in any manner it sees fit so long as it does not unreasonably interfere with the 
Appellants' use of the right of way easement over the property. 
Here, both Nephi Allen (Allen)16 and Kenton Johnson (Johnson) testified that the sign 
post and bollards do not unreasonably interfere with their use of the right-of-way easement: 
Q. The poles or those bollards, do they prevent you from accessing your 
property? 
A. No. 
Q. So you can still access the property where the Rexburg Plumbing and Heating 
is located? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's just talk generally about that. In terms of accessing your property, what 
kind of vehicles do you use to access your property? In other words, I'm 
assuming that you've got plumbing trucks, and HVAC trucks, and maybe a boom 
truck -- I don't know what you've got. So just tell me what do you use to access 
the property? 
A. We have service trucks, we have a forklift, we have delivery trucks, various 
UPS, Federal Express. 
Q. What was that last one? 
A. Federal Express. Just normal everyday usage. 
Q. And is there anything about the location of the pole and these bollards that 
prevent any of these service trucks, delivery trucks, forklifts, or any UPS or 
Federal Express vehicles from accessing your property? 
A. No. 
Q. Over the easement? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Would you then agree that notwithstanding the fact that there's a 
pole and two bollards, your equipment, your service vehicles can still access your 
property on the easement using the easement? 
A. Yeah.17 
* * * 
Q. Let's talk about how this placement the pole and the two bollards interfere 
with your ability to use the easement to access your property. Can we do that? 
A. It doesn't interfere with it. 
Q. It doesn't interfere, does it? 
A. Huh-uh. 
16 R Vol. II, p. 26l. 
17 R Vol. II, pp. 304-305. 
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Q. Is that a --
A. No, sir. 
Q. No interference, does it? 
A. No interference. 
Q. The fact is that --
A. It doesn't interfere with ability to get in and out of there. It doesn't interfere 
with the professional truck driver's ability to get in and out of there .... 18 
* * * 
Q. Well, can you tell me when it was you tried driving a piece of equipment 
over the easement and didn't have enough room, 19.34 feet was not enough 
room to cross the easement --
A. No. 
Q. Let me finish. To cross the easement to access your property? 
A. No. I can't tell you when. 
Q. It's never happened, has it? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, given the Department of Transportation specifications on how wide 
vehicles can be, cars are really not much wider than our trucks. They're 
approximately eight, eight and a half feet, correct? 
A. True. 
Q. And so you could actually have two trucks passing in the 19.34 foot space and 
still be totally on the easement, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And so there is sufficient room for you, and your service people, and delivery 
people, and customers to use the easement to access your property? 
A. Yes, sir. There is today.19 
In short, Appellants have admitted that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably 
interfere with their access to their property; nor do they unreasonably interfere with the 
access of the Appellants' customers, suppliers, or delivery companies. 
18 R Vol. II, p.319. 
19 R Vol. II, p.320. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 18 of 26 
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8223\Pleadings\044 Responding Brief on Appeal.doc 
S. The Dimensions Of The Right Of Way Easement And Placement Of The 
Sign Post And Sollards Prove That Highway lOlls Not Unreasonably 
Interfering With The Right Of Way Privilege. 
The right of way easement is on property that is about 25 feet wide. 20 The sign post and 
bollards are within five or six feet of the northern boundary line leaving at least 19 feet of space 
for use of the right of way easement. 21 The Appellants' property that abuts the right of way 
easement gives the Appellants another 40 feet of space to access their property.22 Thus, there 
is about 59 feet between the sign post and bollards and Appellants' building. 23 The 19 feet of 
the right of way easement for Appellants to use for ingress and egress is wide enough for two 
trucks to pass by each other.24 Thus, there is sufficient room for the Appellants' vehicles, 
trailers, customers and delivery vehicles to access Appellants' property.25 
C. Appellants Have Sustained No Damages Sy Virtue Of The Placement Of The Sign 
Post And Sollards. 
As further evidence that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably interfere with 
Appellants' right of way easement, neither Allen nor Johnson were able to identify a single 
customer or sale that they have lost due to the existence of the sign post and bollards. Thus, 
not only has Highway 101 not unreasonably interfered with Appellants' right of way easement, 
Appellants have sustained no damages. Allen and Johnson testified as follows: 
Q. All right. Can you identify one customer who has not engaged in a purchase 
or has not done business with Rexburg Plumbing because the sign and the 
bollards are located where they are? 
A. I cannot. 26 
20 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
21 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
22 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
23 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
24 R Vol. II, p. 260. 
25 R Vol. II, p. 26l. 
26 R Vol. II, p. 308. 
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* * * 
Q. And then it [the complaint] says, "If allowed to remain, the sign will injure 
plaintiff's business." What injury will the business suffer if the sign is allowed to 
remain? 
A. Well, we believe that those customers that you alluded to earlier that we 
can't name, we believe that they don't come back and visit us ever again. 
Q. Okay. Now, wouldn't you agree that that's based on speculation? 
A. Sure. Certainly.27 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Well, are you claiming that the business in this case 
has been damaged because of the sign? Have you lost any sales? 
A. I am not claiming that. I have no knowledge of that. 
Q. What about you personally, are you claiming you have suffered any money 
damages as a result of the sign being placed on my client's property. 
A N . 28 . 0, sIr. 
* * * 
Q. In your complaint, you say that "If allowed to remain, the sign will result in 
loss of property to the Plaintiff." Can you identify what the loss of property is 
that you will lose if the sign is allowed to remain? 
A. For sure the spot the sign is on. 
Q. All right. Anything else? 
A. I feel at jeopardy. 
Q. Okay. And let's go back to the spot the sign is on, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. You don't actually own that property, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You just have an easement to be able to use it to access your property, 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you've already admitted that you don't have to drive over that spot to 
access your property, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So you really don't lose your right to access your property ifthe sign is 
allowed to remain, do you? 
A. Not today.29 
27 R Vol. II, p. 309. 
28 R Vol. II, p. 321 
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* * * 
Q. Okay. What facts did they give you, besides their opinion, that you need to 
sue in this case to protect that 16 inches where the pipe is and the five inches 
each for the bollards or you will, on a more probable than not basis, suffer some 
property damage? What facts do you have? 
A. I don't have any facts to that they didn't say you will, they said you could. 
Q. Okay. So again, they're speculating, too, because they don't know. 
A. That's probably true. 
Q. SO when it boils down to it, your biggest concern in this case is really based 
on the absence offacts, but on speculation. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And as you sit here, you can't identify one customer who has not done 
business with your business, this Rexburg Plumbing, because of the location of 
the sign? 
A N 
. 30 . 0, sIr. 
In short, Appellants have failed to identify any damages resulting from the 
placement of the sign post and bollards. The only "damage" they could identify is that 
they cannot use the space occupied by the 16 inch sign post and the five inches for each 
ofthe bollards. However, Appellants do not own this property and have no right to 
occupy it because the space occupied by the 16 inch sign post and the five inches for 
each of the bollards does not unreasonably interfere with the Appellants' right of way 
easement. 
V. 
PURPOSE IS RELEVANT IN APPLYING THE REASONABLENESS TEST 
Appellants claim that the purpose for their right of way easement is irrelevant. 
However, Idaho law requires that the Court determine whether Highway 101's use of its 
29 R Vol. II, pp. 321-322. 
30 R Vol. II, p. 322. 
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property unreasonably interferes with Appellants' use. This necessarily requires that the Court 
consider the purpose for which Appellants have an easement. The Court cannot judge whether 
Highway 101's use of its property unreasonably interferes with Appellants' use unless the Court 
considers the purpose of Appellants' use. In Nampa, Appellant also argued that the sidewalk 
and fence would make any possible future cleaning out with heavy equipment difficult if not 
impossible. The Court responded by looking at how the repair and maintenance had actually 
been done, noting that within the past 20 years the maintenance and repair of the ditch had 
been limited to burning the grass and weeds on the ditch bank with the use of a pick-up truck 
and tank of propane. "While past use does not necessarily mean that NMID will never employ 
heavy equipment to clean or repair the lateral, it does suggest that NMID's activity will be so 
infrequent that its easement rights will not be unreasonably interfered with." Nampa & 
Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., supra, 135 Idaho at 523. 
VI. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE ABSENT 
CARELESSNESS OR RECKLESS DISREGARD ON APPELLANTS' PART 
There is ample evidence in this case that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably 
interfere with access to Appellants' property or Appellants' use of the right of way. In an 
attempt to controvert this evidence, Appellants claim that "the sign is hit regularly, and 
particularly when drivers are attempting to turn around or back out of Rexburg Plumbing and 
Heating.,,31 Appellants are trying to make their case like the circular driveway in Carson where 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the raised garden bed unreasonably interfered with the 
general easement because cars would hit the raised garden bed. 
31 See p. 16 of Appellants' Brief dated May 24, 2012. 
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The District Court properly concluded that "even if presumed true, that fact would not 
render the placement of the sign and bollards unreasonable when there is ample evidence that 
delivery trucks, service vehicles, and customers have all be [sic] able to access Appellants' 
property without unreasonable difficulty."32 Moreover, in Carson the extra room in the circle's 
center was required to turn around. Drivers did not strike the raised garden just because they 
were not paying attention. They had no choice if they wanted to turn their vehicle. Here, 
according to Nephi Allen, drivers like himself have embarrassingly struck the sign post and 
bollards in plain sight not because they had to in order to turn their vehicles, but because they 
were not paying attention. 
20 Q. So were you embarrassed when you hit the 
21 bollard? 
22 A. I tried to get out of there pretty quick. 
23 Q. But were you embarrassed? 
24 A. Yeah. I looked around. 
25 Q. So you were embarrassed? 
1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. Why? 
3 A. It's embarrassing. 
4 Q. Is that because it's in such plain sight 
5 you shouldn't hit it? 
6 A. Maybe33 
* * * 
25 Q. Shouldn't they be looking and not hit 
1 the sign? 
2 A. They should.34 
32 R Vol. III, p. 429. 
33 R Vol. II, pp. 517-518 
34 R Vol. II, p. 518. 
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VII. 
HIGHWAY lOllS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Highway 101 requests costs in accordance with I.A.R. 40{a} which provides that II[C]osts 
shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law 
or order of the Court." In addition, Highway 101 is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal 
because Appellants' appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. 
This Court has stated: 
Idaho Code Section 12-121 provides that '[i]n any civil action, the judge may 
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties .... ' Such an award 
is appropriate when this Court has the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Minich v. Gem State 
Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 {1979}. Where the issues raised 
on appeal involve well-settled principles of law, the appeal is frivolous and without 
foundation. See Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1018,829 P.2d 1361, 1367 
{Ct.App.1991}. 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 355 {2003}. In Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 
1012,1018 {Ct.App.1991}, the Idaho Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees to respondents 
on appeal because appellants "made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied 
the law" and the area of law was "well-settled." 
Appellants cite to several cases from other jurisdictions to support their position against 
a reasonableness test. However, the Appellants completely ignore the Nampa case and other 
well-settled Idaho law regarding the reasonableness test. The District Court correctly ruled that 
"After reading the parties' briefs and conducting additional research, this Court finds it 
unnecessary to consult the laws of foreign jurisdictions .... On numerous occasions 
subsequent to Boydstun Beach, the appellate courts of Idaho have addressed the rights and 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 24 of 26 
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8223\Pleadings\044 Responding Brief on Appeal.doc 
privileges of servient estate owners. This court, however, is not aware of any Idaho case that 
has applied something other than the reasonableness test.,,35 
Appellants' argument that it simply disagrees with the District Court's decision is 
without foundation, especially in light of the fact that the law in Idaho is well-settled regarding 
the reasonableness test. Thus, this Court should award attorney's fees and costs to Highway 
101 on appeal because appellants made no substantial showing that the district court 
misapplied the law, and the "reasonableness test" is an area of law that is well-settled in Idaho. 
See Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District. v. Washington Federal Savings, supra, 135 Idaho at 
518 where this court stated "The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of 
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled to 
use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere 
with, the use a/the easement by the owner of the dominant estate (emphasis added.) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants argue that this Court should not apply the reasonableness test that Idaho has 
applied uniformly. Appellants are asking this Court to turn a blind eye to whether Highway 
101's use of its property is reasonable asking the Court instead to apply a bright line/per se test 
that Idaho does not follow and grant them more property rights than they have bargained for 
35 R Vol. III, p.423-424 (emphasis added). 
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and are entitled to. For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the District 
Court's granting summary judgment and award Highway 101 its costs and attorney's fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Ihis;2lJt:!:;;UIY, 2012. 
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